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ABSTRACT  
Jacob Spreyer: An empirical analysis of multimedia rights among Division I FBS institutions 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Jensen) 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to assist intercollegiate athletic departments in making data 
driven decisions when seeking to renegotiate or entering into new multimedia rights agreements. 
Of the 106 Division I public FBS institutions, 54 multimedia rights contracts were collected and 
analyzed for the 2015-2016 season. A stepwise linear regression was employed to develop a 
predictive empirical model, in order to predict contract values for each institution. The predictive 
model confirmed previous research, in that, both the performance and demand variables utilized 
were able to accurately predict a university’s guaranteed rights fee from their multimedia 
contract.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s sport fans have more ways to consume televised broadcasts of their favorite 
team or event than any other time in history. In addition to live television, which has been around 
since 1939 when the first college football game was broadcasted, fans now have the ability to 
view them on their computers, tablets, or smart phones (Galily, 2014: Voort, 2014). The 
technological advancements in television viewership has helped to drive the increase in 
broadcast rights fees paid by networks to televise college sports, to the staggering levels we see 
today. In 1985, the NCAA and CBS inked a three-year deal worth $94.7 million, which included 
the rights to broadcast all intercollegiate athletic events (Jensen, Wakefield, Cobbs, & Turner, 
2016). Twenty-five years later, during the 2010 season, the same two companies signed a 14-
year agreement, giving CBS the rights to only the NCAA Basketball tournament, worth $10.8 
billion. And just last year, the two extended the current 14-year deal by eight years and $8.8 
billion dollars (Sherman, 2016). During that same five-year period the NCAA signed deals with 
CBS for the broadcasting rights to the College Football Playoff. The 12-year deal was signed in 
2012, and pays the NCAA an estimated $470 million annually, or $5.64 billion over the course 
of the agreement (Hinnen, 2012). Between those two agreements alone, the NCAA is now 
earning over $1 billion annually in broadcast rights fees (Sherman, 2016).  
The television broadcast system, as it pertains to intercollegiate athletics as we know it 
today, was vastly different just twenty-five years ago. Beginning in 1953, the NCAA began to 
regulate the number of college football games that could be televised. It was their belief that if 
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too many games were televised it would lead to a decrease in fan attendance (Greenhouse, 1984). 
However, on June 27th, 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court issued their ruling in the NCAA v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association, 
which was a direct challenge to the NCAA’s broadcast regulations of football telecasts (NCAA 
v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 1984). The decision made that day, stating the 1983-1985 
NCAA Television plan violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, returned the property rights of 
football telecasts to individual schools, who could now sell their own broadcast rights as opposed 
to the NCAA selling them for the entire association (Bennett & Fizel, 1995). With the 
regulations lifted, schools began to look for new way to monetize their broadcast rights. 
Conferences began to take control of selling “Tier 1”, “Tier II”, and “Tier III” broadcast rights 
on behalf of their member institutions. “Tier I” and “Tier II” rights consist of a conferences most 
valuable football and men’s basketball games, which are sold to national networks such as CBS, 
ABC, or Fox. The “Tier III” rights are lower level non-conference football and men’s basketball 
games, as well as all non-revenue generating sports (Smith, 2012). Depending on which 
conference a university is affiliated with, they may have no rights to any football or men’s 
basketball games, and in the case of the ACC, institutions do not even have first choice for non-
revenue generating sports (Smith, 2012). With conferences handling the sale of television 
broadcast rights, universities began entering into agreements with third party rights holders who 
sell multimedia rights to sponsors on their behalf. This includes selling assets such as radio or 
television coaches’ shows, athletic facility signage, athletic webpage advertisements, poster or 
schedule cards, and in some cases, may include selling the naming rights for a stadium or arena 
(Zullo, 2013; Kish, 2017). The relationship between the university and the rights holder is 
mutually beneficial, with both parties seeking financial gain from the partnership, and has 
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created a massive market for sponsors looking to partner with a university. These multimedia 
rights agreements are fast becoming a vital part of any athletic department, making a large chunk 
of their annual revenue.  
The purpose of this thesis is to assist intercollegiate athletic departments in predicting the 
guaranteed revenue they should be receiving when they enter into multimedia rights agreements. 
Starting in the 1980’s, Division I FBS universities began to look for corporate sponsors to help 
bring in much needed revenue, and by 1993 more than 90% of NCAA Division I and Division II 
universities had a corporate sponsorship program within their athletic department (Irwin, 1993). 
As intercollegiate athletics evolved so too did the corporate sponsorship programs. Specialized 
companies such as Host Communications (now International Management Group College 
Division) and International Sport Properties (also IMG College) began to offer universities the 
opportunity to outsource their corporate sponsorship programs and in exchange, the third-party 
company sells the university’s “rights” and pay the university a yearly financial guarantee (Zullo, 
2013). Historically, colleges have had few options to choose from when looking to sell their 
multimedia rights. Originally, the only company in this market was Host Communication, but 
following mergers and market growth they now have IMG, Learfield Sports, JMI Sports and 
several others to choose between. This limited the competition for multimedia rights, suppressed 
the contract sizes below what some believed they were worth.  However, as television began to 
drive up broadcast rights fees, the value of an athletic department’s multimedia rights contracts 
rose as well. Nowadays, a large “Power 5” school can see deals in the realm of the one JMI 
Sports inked with the University of Kentucky, which was 15 years and $210 million (Rovell, 
2014). Schools are looking to increase their revenues to match the increase in expenses, and they 
are beginning to realize the worth of their multimedia rights.  
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While all information points to universities seeing large increase in the monetary value of 
their multimedia rights contracts, there has been minimal research done to study why such 
increases are happening. Cornwell, Pruitt and Clark (2005) stated that “this dearth is due in large 
part to the proprietary nature of costs incurred by sponsoring firms” (2005).  Thus, this study 
delineates the factors that impact the revenue gained by universities as it pertains to collegiate 
multimedia rights contracts. In order to do this, a multiple regression analysis is employed to 
develop a predictive empirical model, to determine whether universities have been underpaid or 
overpaid for their multimedia rights (Jensen et al, 2015). The process is similar to the methods 
used in a previous study analyzing the athletic apparel industry (Jensen et al, 2015).  
Collegiate sport sponsorship is highly irregular. Team performance can change 
drastically from year to year, potentially impacting the financial value of the next sponsorship 
contract an institution signs. And, with sponsorship spending exceeding $20 billion in North 
America during 2015, additional research is more important than ever (Jensen et al. 2015). As 
previously stated, due to the proprietary nature of sponsorship contracts, there has been little 
empirical research done on the topic. This study seeks to fill the void by analyzing the contracts 
of 54 Division 1 institutions, making it particularly noteworthy for industry professionals. It will 
help allow marketing managers and collegiate administrators further insight into how variables 
affect sponsorship contracts, thus allowing them to create more accurate financial forecasts 
utilizing hard data.  
STATEMENT OF PUPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to analyze the multimedia rights contracts entered into by 
various FBS institutions, and to provide collegiate administrators additional research into the 
variables that affect the financial size of their multimedia rights contracts. Doing so will allow 
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collegiate administrators to make more informed and educated decisions when reviewing 
sponsorship offers presented to them.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. What are the financial differences between Football Bowl Subdivisions (FBS) institutions 
in guaranteed multimedia rights fees based upon the following criteria:  
a. Whether the institution is a member of a “Power 5” conference  
b. Whether the institution is a member of a “Group of 5” conference  
2. What are the difference among Football Bowl Subdivisions (FBS) institutions in 
guaranteed multimedia rights fees based upon the third-party rights holder with whom 
they partner with? 
3. Are there certain aspects of the individual institution that are statistically significant 
predictors of its guaranteed multimedia rights fees, including:  
a. Student body enrollment  
b. Number of student-athletes  
c. The media market in which the institution resides  
4. Are the institutions’ guaranteed multimedia rights fees predicted by its historical 
performance in the following sports:  
a. Football 
b. Men’s Basketball  
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Agreement – the exclusive Multi-Media rights agreement between the third-party company and a 
university (July 1, 2012 University of Illinois Multi-Media Contract Agreement) attached as 
Exhibit A. 
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Annual Rights Fee – the non-commissionable cash payment that is made by the third-party 
company to the university. (September 1, 2008 University of Connecticut Multi-Media Rights 
Agreement) attached as Exhibit B 
Broadcast – this includes any live, delayed or repeat broadcast and/or transmission by means of 
radio or any similar methods (September 1, 2008 Exhibit B).  
Copyright – ownership of University content, which can include but is not limited to, radio, 
television, print and internet, formed as a consequence of an Agreement (July 1, 2012 Exhibit A).  
Multi-Media Rights Contract – the exclusive sale and marketing rights to all inventory associated 
with a University’s athletic program, including, print, media, sponsorships, coaches radio shows 
(both radio and television), existing or new signage, other promotional and sponsorship rights, as 
well as mutually agreed upon television broadcast rights for football, men’s and women’s 
basketball (July 1, 2012 Exhibit A).  
Sponsorship – the messages on signage, giveaway items and other promotional opportunities as 
stipulated by the Multi-Media Rights contract (July 1, 2012 Exhibit A).  
Telecast – any live, delayed or repeat telecast and or transmission by means of television 
transmission or any similar methods (September 1, 2008 Exhibit B). 
LIMITATIONS 
The major limitation of this thesis was the inability collect contracts from private 
institutions, relying solely on contracts of public universities, who by law, must release such 
information when requested. Some of the largest institutions, who would likely have large 
multimedia rights contracts, such as the University of Southern California, Syracuse University, 
Notre Dame, Stanford University and Duke University, are inaccessible. Additionally, some large 
institutions such as the University of Oregon, University of Colorado at Boulder, and Mississippi 
St, supplied the contracts but redacted the financial data needed for this thesis.  
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An additional limitation, when trying to compare the means among third party 
multimedia rights holders, will be the unequal number of contracts. New companies such as JMI 
have fewer than five contracts, while more established companies such as IMG and Learfield 
have over 30.  
Finally, we only operationalized men’s basketball and football, meaning that other sports 
who could influence demand were not accounted for. One example of this would be the UConn 
women’s basketball team, who is frequently televised and could be a driver of demand.  
DELIMITATIONS 
This thesis will look at contracts from public institutions, competing at the NCAA D1 
FBS level. Private institutions are not required to publicize multimedia rights contracts, however, 
since schools compete with one another athletically and academically, we can make 
generalizations about private institutions based upon the collected data.  
ASSUMPTIONS 
The major assumption for this thesis is that the contracts provided by the universities to 
Matt Kish, who then made his database publicly available, were complete and accurate. 
Additionally, it is assumed that the historical data published by the NCAA is complete and 
accurate. 
 8 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
 To properly assess the demand for college athletics as it relates to multimedia rights, one 
must look at the historical evolution of football telecasts with a focus on changes that have 
resulted in increased demand for college athletics. Scully (1985), Greenspan (1998), and 
Mawson and Bowler III (1989), have analyzed the landscape of collegiate athletics with a 
specific focus on the environment before and after NCAA v. University of Oklahoma Board of 
Regents case, specifically look at the effects on attendance, TV ratings, and broadcast rights fees. 
Within the historical context, it is clear how these indicators, over time, have influenced the 
demand for multimedia rights contracts.  
ORIGIN OF TELEVISION BROADCAST  
 From the first televised football game in the late 1930’s until 1952, when the NCAA 
began to regulate football telecasts, schools faced no NCAA limitations, and were free to make 
their own contracts with any network or television station (Greenspan, 1988). Scrutiny toward 
television broadcasts began in 1948 when there was a study conducted involving east coast 
institutions who frequently televised their football games. The goal of that study was to 
determine if there was any correlation between an increase in TV broadcast and a decrease in 
attendance. What they found was there was neither evidence to deem television broadcasts 
beneficial or harmful to attendance (Mawson & Bowler III, 1989). Two years later, during the 
1950-1951 season, the NCAA formed a three-person “Television Committee” who delivered a 
report that indicated television was having an adverse effect on attendance, prompting the NCAA 
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to hire the National Opinion Research Center to conduct a study of their own, certain that 
football broadcasts were a direct threat to gate receipts (Scully, 1989). The study found that in 
areas which saw no TV competition to live games attendance rose by 10.5%, but in areas facing 
direct TV competition attendance dropped by 16.2% (Greenspan, 1988). The findings alarmed 
members of the NCAA, triggering their one game per week limit in 1951, which was ultimately 
adopted by the entire association in 1952, almost unanimously in fact (Mawson & Bowler III, 
1989: Greenspan, 1988). The new set of rules adopted in 1952 drastically changed football 
broadcasts, limiting it to one televised game per week, for a total of 12 throughout the season. 
Teams could only appear once per season and needed to obtain NCAA approval if they wished to 
conduct local broadcasts. Member institutions believed that this system would be to the benefit 
of football attendance and voiced little displeasure for the next 25 years.  
 In 1976 the NCAA began to see more organized push back on their television rights plan, 
for this was the year that the College Football Association (CFA) came into formation. The CFA 
was comprised of institutions from the Big East, Southeastern Conference, Southwestern 
Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, Western Athletic Conference, and a handful of 
independent football powers such as Notre Dame and Penn State. Notably absent, were the Big 
Ten and Pac-10, who felt that the CNAA plan benefited all parties involved and had no desire to 
see it changed. Originally formed to lobby and promote the interests of major football 
institutions within the NCAA governance structure, the CFA soon realized that the seminal issue 
facing the prominent football institutions was the NCAA’s restrictive television plan (Greenspan, 
1988). The CFA believed that by limiting the number of broadcasts, in addition to controlling the 
number of appearances a university could make in a given year, that prominent football 
institutions were leaving money on the table that they could otherwise be collecting (Dunnavant, 
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2004). Despite dissent from the CFA who as still trying to figure out the proper course of action 
once the current television agreement with ABC expired in 1981, the NCAA began negotiations 
for the 1982-1985 seasons. When the negotiations were over the NCAA had signed a four-year 
deal with ABC and CBS worth $262 million, which more than doubled the television revenue it 
received in the 1977-1981 contract (Dunnavant, 2004). Still unhappy with the NCAA appearance 
rules as well as the fact smaller, non-football institutions received a share of the television 
revenue, the CFA entered into a separate four-year, $180 million agreement with NBC 
(Dunnavant, 2004). The agreement allowed institutions in the CFA to be televised four times per 
season, and reduced the number of schools who shared in the revenue to the 61 CFA members 
(Dunnavant, 2004). Soon after the NCAA issued a statement that any schools who chose to be a 
part of that deal risked probation or possible expulsion from the NCAA (Greenspan, 1988). This 
threat by the NCAA resulted in the CFA declining NBC’s offer, and prompted the University of 
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia to file suit on behalf of the CFA, arguing the NCAA’s 
restrictions on TV appearances violated the Sherman Antitrust Act (Mawson & Bowler III, 
1989).  
 The ruling by Judge Burciaga on September 14, 1982 was a blow to the NCAA. Judge 
Burciaga stated that by having almost complete control over the supply of college football the 
NCAA was able to artificially inflate prices, place production limitations on their members, and 
set uniform prices with no regard to the differences in quality of product (Dunnavant, 2004). 
However, the decision was stayed until an appeals court could review the case, leaving in place 
the current television rules. During the two years it took the case to get before the court of 
appeals, college football viewership was at an all-time high. Advertisement costs had risen 137% 
in an eight-year period to $57,000, and rights fees had jumped to $1.2 million for a national 
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appearance (Dunnavant, 2004). When the ruling came down 2-1, upholding Judge Burciaga’s 
ruling the NCAA sought out Supreme Court Justice White, a former running back at the 
University of Colorado, to stay the appellate court’s decision (Dunnavant, 2004). Justice white 
agreed to stay the decision as the case made its way before the Supreme Court. While the 
Supreme Court admitted the NCAA’s implementation of the rules was intended to benefit the 
member institutions by sustaining competitive balance and protecting gate receipts; upon further 
investigation, they found that by prohibiting member institutions from selling their own 
broadcast rights they created market restraints, and engaged in price fixing behavior (Scully, 
1985: Greenspan, 1989). They ruled against the NCAA, finding they were indeed in violation of 
Section I of the Sherman Act, thus giving university’s the right to sell their own television 
broadcasts (Scully, 1985).  
 In the first year following the ruling, money from television was down over 60 percent. 
The NCAA had received $66 million in 1983 and was set to receive $74.5 million in 1984, but 
after the ruling, the CFA, Big Ten and Pac-10 were only receiving a combined $23 million in 
1984 (Dunnavant, 2004). Along with a loss in network money, advertisements fell from an all-
time high in 1983 to a mere $15,000 in 1984. College football spent the next decade trying to get 
back to the money they had seen in 1983, with the CFA, Big Ten and Pac-10 all feeling the 
financial impact. Adding insult to injury the CFA was being sued by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) for violation of anti-trust laws, the very same ones that they had used against 
the NCAA. In 1991, the CFA thought they had turned a corner, signing deals with ABC and 
ESPN for $300 million, finally seeing offers similar to the ones in 1983 and hoping this was the 
result of the free market they fought so hard to get. However, when Notre Dame announced they 
would be leaving the CFA, signing their own contract with NBC, they were forced to renegotiate 
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and take $45 million less than originally offered. Five years later the CFA finally collapsed when 
the SEC left, signing a five year, $85 million-dollar contract with CBS, doubling the earnings 
they had received from the CFA. The CFA fought for more than twenty years to give football 
powers the right to control their own interests, succeeding in their battle of opening up the 
markets, and leaving us with what we see today.  
ATTENDANCE 
 Attendance has long been used as the proxy through which researchers have attempted to 
explain demand. One reason for this is due to the prior research that has shown the three main 
sources of revenues for college athletic departments are gate receipts, TV revenue, and post 
season play, in that order (Noll, 1991). Starting in the 1940’s and 1950’s, collegiate sport leaders 
began to worry about the impact television could have on gate receipts. Several eastern 
institutions were televising every football game and began to notice a precipitous drop in 
attendance, causing the NCAA to take notice. Following several studies, the NCAA voted to 
begin regulating football television broadcast. Despite almost unanimous support in 1952, there 
were many questions surrounding the data in the NCAA studies, which is why such extensive 
research has been conducted on the subject. Pace and Wickham (1985), Kaempfer and Pacey 
(1986), Fizel and Bennett (1989), and Bennett and Fizel (1995) have conducted thorough 
research surrounding the effects that television broadcasts have on attendance. Kaempfer and 
Pacey (1986) were the first to report that television and game attendance are complementary, 
propounding, that following the NCAA v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents Supreme 
Court decision, game attendance would increase due to an increase in exposure. The study 
analyzed the period between 1975 and 1981, when there was a 40% increase in exposure of 
football telecasts, discovering that the attendance increased by roughly 2.8% following the 1978-
1981 TV Plan. While their study may have found telecasts and attendance to be complementary 
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between 1975 and 1981, they failed to addresses the limitation of postulating these results to a 
post Supreme Court era. Following the model used by Kaempfer and Pacey (1986), Fizel and 
Bennett (1989) looked to expand upon their research by utilizing both pre and post Supreme 
Court ruling data to determine whether attendance and telecasts were complements or 
substitutes. Fizel and Bennett (1989) had several contradictory findings when compared to those 
produced by Kaempfer and Pacey (1986), discovering a complementary relationship between 
past television exposure and current gate attendance. While they acknowledge some of the 
differences between the two studies could stem from market saturation or differing samples, 
Fizel and Bennett (1989) believe that Division I institutions are in a poorer position in regards to 
gate receipts following the Supreme Court decision than they were before.  
While using attendance as a metric for demand has been employed for decades, there is 
still little consensus on how it is directly impacted by television broadcasts. This is partly due to 
the multitude of variables, both on the field and off the field that impact a fans decision to attend 
a game. Research in the area of assessing demand, whether for singular sport or for an athletic 
department as a whole, utilize television ratings, as they are a more modern and potentially more 
accurate reflection of demand.  
TELEVISION RATINGS 
Indicative of the expanding role and growing importance television is playing in the sport 
industry, there has been more research done that analyzes television viewership for football 
telecasts (Tainsky, 2010: Tainsky & McEvoy, 2012: Tainsky et al, 2012). The first study, 
Tainsky (2010) looked to fill a research void by using television broadcasts to assess demand as 
opposed to using attendance data. By utilizing this method, the goal was to determine the 
demand for National Football League (NFL) games, both in home and visiting team markets. 
This study is critically important because Tainsky (2010) discovered a symmetry between this 
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study and past studies, noting that if one was to apply the same framework he applied it could be 
used to extrapolate information about other revenue sources, such as multimedia rights. Through 
studying television broadcasts per the lenses of multiple game-related variables, it was found that 
the quality of the team, game times, and the tenure of the team within the market all had positive 
influences on demand. Tainsky and McEvoy (2012) built upon the original study by focusing on 
the demand for football in areas which lacked NFL teams. Results indicated that similar 
variables from Tainsky (2010), such as quality of team and market tenure, were shown to impact 
demand in markets which lacked NFL teams. Additional variables that similarly showed a 
correlation between television broadcasts and demand were the proximity of a fan to the team, 
late-season games, and games involving historically popular teams. The most recent study, 
Tainsky et al. (2012) used broadcast ratings to look at the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis and 
determined how that impacted demand. They found that game uncertainty played no role in 
impacting demand within a team’s local markets, but had an impact for outside markets. Fans, 
not in the local market, were more inclined to watch a game between two evenly matched teams. 
All three of these studies ought to reflect the growing importance that broadcast rights fees have 
had on the sport industry. 
 The importance of television ratings is illustrated further by the increase in sport 
programming, and the subsequent increase in sponsor interest. Since 2005, the amount of sports 
programming has increased 160%, while during the same period sponsor spending has doubled 
to $14.59 billion (Ourand, 2016: Nielsen, 2016). This is due in part to the fact that over 95% of 
sport programming takes place live, making it the least time-shifted genre on television (Nielsen, 
2016). In an era where almost 50% of homes have a DVR, sponsors are beginning to realize the 
value of live programming, shifting their reliance away from traditional advertisements during 
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commercial breaks, to in game brand integration methods (Nielsen, 2016a: Jensen, 2012: Jensen 
& Cobbs, 2014). This change will allow sponsors to gain brand recognition both during the live 
event, and during commercial breaks. One such sponsor to utilize this type of marketing mix is 
Allstate, who partners with over 80 universities to have their logo hanging in the field goal 
netting, while also partnering with networks for the more traditional advertisement during 
commercial breaks. The prior research, combined with the recent data regarding the increase in 
popularity of live television programming, delineates how the same framework can be used to 
estimate the value of multimedia rights.  
BROADCAST RIGHTS FEES 
 The literature published by Mawson and Bowler III (1989) regarding the NCAA TV 
broadcast rights fees prior to the 1984 ruling, when compared to the study done by Jensen, 
Turner, and McEvoy (2015) about modern broadcast rights fees as related to conference 
affiliation, clearly illustrates that as demand for college sports increased, so did broadcast rights 
fees.  
Following the Supreme Court decision broadcast rights fees have propagated 
significantly more revenues for the NCAA, individual conferences and member institutions. The 
increased deals have resulted in considerably larger payouts to member institutions who have 
become more reliant on TV money to fund their athletic departments. There are numerous 
examples of recent broadcast rights contracts that illustrate the increased demand for 
intercollegiate athletics. In 2011 the ACC expanded the conference, adding the University of 
Pittsburgh and Syracuse University. The addition of two new members allowed the ACC to 
renegotiate their 12-year, $1.86 billion contract that paid out $12.9 million annually per 
institution, to a new 15-year, $3.6 billion contract, that now paid each member $17.1 million 
annually (Jensen, Turner, & McEvoy, 2015: Smith & Ourand, 2011: Smith & Ourand, 2012: 
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Hiestand, 2012). That same year the Big 12 who also happened to add two additional schools, 
West Virginia University and Texas Christian University, entered into a 13-year, $2.6 billion-
dollar contract with ESPN and Fox (Smith 2012a, b). In 2016 the Big 12 flirted with another 
expansion, but ultimately decided against it when ESPN reportedly offered to pay an additional 
$10 million annually for the remainder of their contract (Bromberg, 2016). The Pac-12 partnered 
with ESPN and Fox, signing the largest ever broadcast rights contract at the time, worth $3 
billion over 12 years, paying out over $250 million each season (Bachman, 2013). That record 
did not last long, with the Big Ten’s new deal signed in 2016. The Big Ten signed a 6 year deal 
with Fox, ESPN, and CBS that will bring in $440 million annually, resulting in member 
institutions receiving $32.4 million each year (Ourand, 2016b: Dochterman, 2016).  
 The increases that we have seen between 1984 and 2016 in broadcast rights fees are one 
of the biggest indicators of demand that exists in sport. Although the total number of television 
viewers has actually declined in recent years broadcast rights fees continue to go up. Companies 
see the value in live sport, but they look carefully at which conferences and which universities 
will provide them the largest return on investment. It is through the use of broadcast rights fees, 
attendance, and television ratings that we can begin to see a clear picture about what drives 
demand for collegiate athletic departments.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This thesis is guided by the use of economic demand theory, which will help explain how 
the demand for college athletics, as demonstrated through fan attendance, television ratings, and 
broadcast rights fees, have impacted the value of individual institutions multimedia rights 
contracts.  
 As the demand for sport has increased, economic demand theory has provided the 
necessary framework to explore which determinants have the greatest impact on consumer 
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decision making. Based upon the consumer theory model, economic demand theory seeks to 
better explain the relationship between consumer demand for a product or a service and price, by 
taking into account important economic, demographic and market determinants (Watanabe, Yan 
& Soebbing, 2015). The demand theory forms what is commonly known as the demand curve, 
illustrating consumer motivation (the amount they are willing to pay) in relation to the amount of 
goods or services available. With price and quantity inversely related, we see that as more goods 
or services become available the price will decrease. In their study of the past research on 
demand, Borland and MacDonald (2003), discovered five categories that influence consumer 
behavior: consumer preferences or habits, economic price, quality of viewing, sporting contest 
and supply capacity. The research to date, utilizing these five categories, has been applied on a 
limited basis, with the majority of studies using attendance or competitive balance as the demand 
determinant and applying them within a cross sectional study (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). As 
schools seek to increase revenue to match rising expenses, they have become ever more reliant 
upon the guaranteed fees received from their multimedia rights. Knowing this, it is important to 
further the research in order to understand the impact demand has on the values of an institutions 
multimedia rights contract.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTRUMENTS  
 The primary research method employed for this study was contract review and 
descriptive statistical analysis. This is comparable with Wishart et al. (2012) who advised using 
the actual contracts when attempted to analyze sponsorship costs. Per the review of each 
multimedia rights contract, the study identified which media rights holder the institution is 
partnered with, as well as the size of the guaranteed rights fees they receive. Following the 
contract review, quantitative analysis was used to detect differences in sample means and 
determine whether the findings were statistically significant. If the results indicated statistical 
significance, it is necessary to determine if that significance is relevant when applied in a real-
world context.  
DRAWING THE SAMPLE  
 Creation of the sample began by generating a list of all public institutions who presently 
compete at the NCAA Division 1 FBS level. The potential sample of this study was 106 public 
institutions, out of a total population of 128. The size of this sample is tantamount of Jensen et al. 
(2015) study forecasting sponsorship costs in the athletic apparel industry. Below is a list of the 
contracts analyzed for the purpose of this study.  
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Table 1 
Contracts Analyzed 
School 
Annual Fee 
(2015/2016) 
Rights Holder 
 
Conference 
 
Texas  $12,728,829 IMG Big 12 
Nebraska  $11,250,000 IMG Big Ten 
Georgia  $10,600,000 IMG SEC 
Ohio State $10,315,000 IMG Big Ten 
UCLA  $10,000,000 IMG Pac-12 
Kentucky $9,250000 JMI SEC 
Connecticut $8,608,000 IMG American 
LSU $8,000,000 IMG SEC 
Michigan $7,750,000 IMG Big Ten 
Auburn  $7,500,000 Fox Sports Net SEC 
North Carolina $7,127,769 Learfield ACC 
Wisconsin $7,075,000 Learfield Big Ten 
Arizona $6,990,000 IMG Pac-12 
Michigan State $6,875,000 Fox Sports Net Big Ten 
Oregon $6,800,000 IMG Pac-12 
Iowa $6,607,000 Learfield Big Ten 
Washington  $6,500,000 IMG Pac-12 
Kansas $6,350,000 IMG Big Ten 
Oklahoma State $6,245,000 Learfield Big 12 
West Virginia $6,201,000 IMG Big 12 
Tennessee $6,191,862 IMG SEC 
Florida State $5,900,000 IMG ACC 
Louisville  $5,650,000 Learfield ACC 
Georgia Tech $5,450,000 IMG ACC 
Rutgers $5,150,000 IMG Big Ten 
Minnesota $5,125,349 Learfield Big Ten 
Virginia $5,100,000 Outfront Media ACC 
Virginia Tech $4,950,000 IMG ACC 
New Mexico  $4,768,000 Learfield Mountain West 
North Carolina State $4,675,000 Learfield ACC 
Kansas State $4,550,000 Learfield Big 12 
Indiana $3,855,000 Learfield Big Ten 
Purdue $3,850,000 Learfield Big Ten 
Texas A&M $3,713,000 Learfield SEC 
Texas Tech  $3,475,000 Learfield Big 12 
Iowa State  $3,450,000 Learfield Big 12 
Missouri  $3,355,000 Learfield SEC 
UNLV $3,300,000 IMG Mountain West 
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Boise State $2,935,000 Learfield Mountain West 
Cincinnati  $2,700,000 IMG American 
Clemson  $2,600,000 JMI ACC 
South Florida  $2,276,000 IMG American 
Washington State  $2,250,000 IMG Pac-12 
Memphis  $2,225,000 Learfield American 
Oregon State $2.050,000 Learfield Pac-12 
San Diego State  $1,823,000 Learfield Mountain West 
Nevada  $1,800,000 IMG Mountain West 
Texas El Paso  $1,650,000 IMG Conference USA 
East Carolina  $1,625,000 IMG American 
Western Kentucky  $1,500,000 IMG Conference USA 
Marshall  $1,400,000 IMG Conference USA 
Texas San Antonio  $1,375,000 Learfield Conference USA 
Southern Mississippi $1,230,000 IMG Conference USA 
Louisiana Monroe  $1,000,000 Self Sold Sun Belt 
Middle Tennessee 
State  
$900,000 Learfield Conference USA 
Florida Atlantic  $800,000 Nelligan Conference USA 
Idaho  $760,000 Learfield Sun Belt 
Bowling Green  $675,000 Learfield MAC 
Georgia Southern  $675,000 Learfield Sun Belt 
Appalachian State  $640,000 IMG Sun Belt 
Ohio  $625,000 IMG MAC 
Akron  $470,000 IMG MAC 
Northern Illinois  $425,000 IMG MAC 
 
ACQUIRING THE CONTRACTS   
 An online database of multimedia rights contracts created by Portland Business Journal 
writer Matt Kish (Kish, 2017) was utilized. To create the database, public records requests to 
each of the 106 public institutions. The database consisted of 83 of the 106 possible contracts, 
however, not all contracts were accessible due to redactions.  
CONTRACT REVIEW 
 After acquiring the contracts, each contract was examined to determine which third-party 
rights holder was being used. Additionally, guaranteed rights payments were recorded on a year 
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by year basis for the duration of the contract. Conference affiliation was also recorded for each 
school according to that year’s guaranteed rights payment.   
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons were utilized using the collected data. 
Descriptive statistics such as mean, maximum and minimum were used to illustrate differences 
within conferences, between “Power 5” and “Group of 5” schools, between various rights 
holders, and within Division 1 FBS as a whole.  
 A simple correlation and multiple regression were utilized to probe the influences various 
independent variables had on the institutions multimedia rights contracts. The independent 
variables used were based upon prior literature and were reflective of the institutions academic 
and athletic accomplishments, as well as the market in which they are located. Due to the depth 
of research relating to the demand for an institutions athletic programs as well as on-field 
performance of the primary sports (men’s basketball and football), many of the independent 
variables were pulled from previous studies where they were show to be significant. Those 
variables included in this thesis are average attendance, stadium or arena capacity; and percent 
capacity of the stadium/arena for both primary sports (Groza, 2010: Kaempfer and Pacey, 1986: 
Fizel and Bennett, 1989). Additional variables are the number of post season bowl appearances 
(Groza, 2010), the number of NCAA men’s basketball tournament appearances (Groza, 2010) 
the historical win percentages for both primary sports (Kaempfer and Pacey, 1986), the number 
of years the institution has sponsored the program (Price and Sen, 2003), as well as the total 
number of wins for both football and men’s basketball (Jensen et al. 2015). The market variables 
selected are also common among previous literature and are the population surrounding the 
institution, as defined by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the media house-hold income, 
and the number of TV households within the schools Designed Market Area (Nielsen, 2014). 
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Lastly, the property variables utilized in this study are, the institutions membership in one of the 
“Power 5” athletic conference’s (Jensen et al. 2015), number of regular students enrolled at an 
institution, as well as the number of student athletes they have (according to the US Department 
of Education’s Equity in Athletics reports).  
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CHAPTER 4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
After conducting an analysis of descriptive statistics, as found in Table I, the results 
reveal that $224.6 million dollars (M=$4.16 million, SD=$2.99 million) was spent across the 54 
multimedia rights agreements during the 2015-2016 school year. The smallest financial payout is 
$375,000 and belongs to Northern Illinois, while the largest contract $12,358,087 million, 
belonging to the University of Texas.   
The disparity among institutions becomes more evident when analyzing the multimedia 
rights contracts. Of the $224.6 million dollars spent during the 2015-2016 season, $182.3 million 
was spent on institutions who compete in one of the “Power 5” conferences, meaning that the 31 
“Power 5” institutions in this study receive 81.2% of the multimedia rights money.  As seen in 
Table II, the average “Power 5” institution receives an average payment of $5.879 million dollars 
with a SD of $2.539 million. The “Group of 5” institutions received a sum of $42.32 million 
from multimedia rights contracts during the 2015-2016 season, roughly $139 million less than 
their “Power 5” counterparts.  As seen in Table II, the average payout for a “Group of 5” 
institution is $1.84 million with a SD of $1.72 million.  
Table III shows that within the “Power 5” conferences the Big Ten Conference has the 
highest average payout at $6.58 million (SD = $2.57 million), followed by the SEC 
(Southeastern Conference), (M= $6.50 million, SD= $3.21 million), the Big 12 (M= $5.88 
million, SD=$3.10 million), the ACC (M= $5.37, SD= $889,364), and lastly the Pac-12 
(M=$4.29, SD= $2.57). As highlighted in Table IV, institutions in the American Athletic 
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Conference receive the highest average payouts among the “Group of 5”, with an average 
guarantee of $3.32 million (SD= $2.72 million). Behind the American is the Mountain West (M= 
$2.78 million, SD= $1.29 million), Conference USA (M= $1.16, SD= $322,348), Sun Belt (M= 
$750,000, SD= $216,506) and lastly, with the smallest average guarantees, the MAC (M= 
$476,667, SD= $114,054).  
 IMG College is largest rights holder, both in terms of number of contracts, 29, and in 
terms of total spending during the 2015-2016 season, $131.43 million. In terms of total spending, 
IMG is followed by Learfield (Sum = $82.3 million), JMI (Sum = $11.9 million). It is important 
to note that JMI is relatively new when it comes to college multimedia rights contracts, and only 
has two institutions, which is reflected in their low total payout. However, as illustrated in Table 
V, JMI has a higher average payout than the two larger companies, IMG and Learfield, 
(M=$5.93 million, SD= $4.7 million). JMI will see an increase in their average payout during the 
2016-2017 as well as during the 2017-2018 seasons with addition of Clemson who will make 
$2.6 million to $7.7 million during the respective seasons. IMG and Learfield are relatively 
similar in average payouts, with IMG averaging $4.53 million (SD = $3.52 million) and 
Learfield averaging $3.74 million (SD= $1.87 million). IMG and Learfield, both with over 20 
contracts a piece have a far greater range of contract sizes, with IMG controlling both the 
smallest payout, $375,000, and the largest payout, $12.36 million.  
Table II  
 
“Power 5” and “Group of 5” Descriptive Statistics  
 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Power 5 31 $2,000,000 $12,358,087 $182,262,631 $5,879,440 $2,538,518 
Group of 5 23  $375,000   $8,138,000   $42,320,000  $1,840,000  $1,716,216  
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Table III  
 
“Power 5” Descriptive Statistics by Conference  
 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
ACC 6 $4,525,000 $7,034,852 $32,209,852 $5,368,309 $889,364 
Big Ten 9 $3,650,000 $10,750,000 $59,203,082 $6,578,120 $2,568,471 
Big 12 7 $3,275,000 $12,358,087 $41,167,087 $5,881,012 $3,099,329 
Pac 12 4 $2,000,000 $6,767,500 $17,167,500 $4,291,875 $2,569,260 
SEC 5 $3,315,000 $10,500,000 $32,515,110 $6,503,022 $3,208,038 
 
Table IV  
 
“Group of 5” Descriptive Statistics by Conference  
 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
American  5 $1,525,000 $8,138,000 $16,614,000 $3,322,800 $2,721,248 
MAC  3 $375,000 $600,000 $1,430,000 $476,667 $114,054 
Sun Belt  3 $625,000 $1,000,000 $2,250,000 $750,000 $216,506  
Conference USA  7 $700,000 $1,575,000 $8,120,000 $1,160,000 $322,348 
Mountain West 5 $1,430,000 $4,668,000 $13,906,000 $2,781,200 $1,287,911 
 
Table V  
 
Multimedia Rights Descriptive Statistics by Company  
 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
IMG 29 $375,000 $12,358,087 $131,431,597 $4,532,124 $3,517,445 
Learfield 22 $625,000 $7,034,852 $82,301,034 $3,740,956 $1,867,554 
JMI/ Nelligan 2 $750,000 $9,100,000 $9,850,000 $4,925,000 $5,904,342 
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CORRELATION RESULTS  
 The variables outlined in Table VI were used in an attempt to explain the effect that 
numerous factors have on the guaranteed rights fee that a university receives from a third-party 
rights holder. Those variables were separated into four-categories; property-related, football 
performance, basketball performance, and demand indicators. From there, a Pearson product-
moment correlation was applied to all of the variables, with the results being located in Tables  
VII through XI. It is important to note that of the 21 variables tested, 18 showed a significant 
positive correlation, with p < .05, and eight of the 18 had r values greater than .50.  
 Research question three asked whether certain aspects of individual institutions are 
statistically significant predictors of guaranteed multimedia rights fees, based on student body 
enrollment, number of student-athletes, and the media market in which the institutions resides. 
As indicated in Table VII, this was the case for two of the three variables: enrollment and 
number of student-athletes. The correlation between enrollment and rights fees was .476, which 
was significant at the p < .01 level, and the correlation between number of student-athletes and 
rights fees was .581, which was also significant at the p < .01 level.  
 Research question four sought to determine whether an institution’s guaranteed 
multimedia rights fee can be predicted by historical performance in football and men’s 
basketball. To assess historical performance, this study utilized the following indicators, years 
with a program, total number of wins, career win percentage and the number of post season 
appearances. Three of the four historical indicators (years with a team, total wins, and bowl 
appearances) for football showed significant correlation at the p < .01 level, and one of the four 
(total win percentage) showed significant correlation at the p <.05 level. Similarly, three of the 
four historical indicators for basketball showed significant correlation at the p <.01 level, total 
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wins, win percentage, and NCAA post season appearances, with the fourth indicator, years with 
a program, showing significant correlation at the p <.05 level.  
 
 
Table VI  
 
Demand Indicators Descriptive Statistics  
 n Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Property       
TVHH 54 43,985 7,368,320 952,236.5 1,160,190.6 
MSAPOP 54 15,344 5,710,795 868,049.4 1,192,598.3 
MEDIANINCOME 54 13,149 70,638 42,656.1 12,396.8 
ENROLL 54 4,842 42,017 21,014.0 7577.2 
TOTALATHLETES 54 382 1,162 620.6 171.2 
POWER 54 0 1 0.57 0.499 
      
Historical Football Performance       
YEARSFB 54 5 145 105.7 30.4 
WINSFB 54 21 915 553.2 190.6 
WPCTFB 54 0.405 0.729 0.5 0.1 
BOWLAPP 54 0 53 19.8 15.1 
      
Historical Basketball Performance      
YEARSBB 54 27 120 100 21 
WINSBB 54 292 2,178 1434 352 
WPCTBB 54 0.372 0.764 1 0 
NCAAAPPBB 54 1 56 18 13 
      
Historical Indicators of Demand      
PCTCAPBB 54 0.146 1.024 0.67 0.25 
AVGATTBB 54 1,072 23,361 9237.67 5473.83 
AVGATTFB 54 11,732 110,168 47254.78 26297.12 
PCTCAPFB 54 0.354 1.689 0.83 0.24 
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Table VII  
  
Property-Related Variables  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. RIGHTS FEE -       
2.TVHH .135 -      
3. MSAPOP .158 .219 -     
4. MEDIAN INCOME .272* .051 .407** -    
5. ENROLL .476** .143 .105 .276* -   
6. POWER .566** .053 -.034 .274* .585** -  
7. TOTAL ATHLETES .581** .135 .102 .305* .626** .609** - 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table VIII  
 
Historical Football Performance Variables  
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. RIGHTS FEE -     
2. YEARSFB .404** -    
3. WINSFB .464** .827** -   
4. BOWLAPP .582** .437** .744** -  
5. WPCTFB .314* .226 .709** .704** - 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table IX  
 
Historical Basketball Performance Variables  
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. RIGHTS FEE -      
2. YEARSBB .334* -     
3. WINSBB .415** .802** -    
4. PCTBB .371** .399** .826** -   
5. NCAAAPPBB .557** .404** .788** .840** - 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table X  
 
Historical Indicators of Demand  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. RIGHTS FEE -        
2. PCTCAPBB .524** -       
3. AVGATTBB .559** .864** -      
4. AVGATTFB .637** .422** .452** -     
5. PCTCAPFB .255 .178 .155 .543** -    
6. STADCAPFB .634** .429** .469** .899** .185 -   
7. STADCAPBB .499** .575** .880** .460** .126 .469** - 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
PREDICTIVE MODELING  
 Once the performance variables were analyzed using both descriptive statistics and a 
series of bivariate correlations, a stepwise linear regression was applied. This procedure is 
similar to the one utilized by Jensen et al. (2015) in their paper on athletic apparel contracts,and 
was employed to develop a possible set of predictor variables that could be used to project 
whether or not universities were receiving sufficient compensation via their multimedia 
guaranteed rights payments. The step wise multiple linear regression reduces the chance of 
multicollinearity while also maintaining informative capabilities.  
 Using stadium capacity for football, NCAA basketball post season appearances, and 
“Power 5” affiliation, a significant regression equation was found (F (3,50) =25.93, p<.001), 
with an R2=.609. Multicollinearity was not observed, and all of the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) fell below 2. The unstandardized coefficient, as seen in Table XII, illustrate the projected 
revenue for each institution according to the multimedia rights contract guaranteed rights fee. 
The coefficients show that for each NCAA Tournament appearance it is worth $56,395 in 
increased revenue, each additional fan who attends a football game is valued at $47 and 
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membership in a Power 5 conference is worth $2,137,528 in increased revenue to the respective 
university.  
Table XI  
 
Model Summary  
 
R R2 Adjusted R2 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 .780a .609 .585 $1,925,131.946 
a. Predictors: (Constant), STADCAPFB, NCAAAPPBB, POWER 
 
 
Table XII 
 
Coefficients Table  
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -766061.54 724877.54 - 1.057 .296 - - 
NCAAAPPBB 56395.52 23862.91 .246 2.363 .022 .721 1.387 
POWER 2137528.13 686069.92 .357 3.116 .003 .596 1.677 
STADCAPFB 47.68 13.62 .364 3.500 .001 .723 1.383 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS  
 This thesis investigated the relationship of multimedia rights contracts between third 
party rights holders and intercollegiate athletic departments, yielding several important results 
that will help collegiate administrator’s secure fair multimedia rights contracts.  
 Analysis into the data revealed financial differences in projected guaranteed multimedia 
rights payments based upon an institution membership in the “Power 5” or “Group of 5”. Being 
in a “Power 5” conference garnered institutions more money, however, according to the 
predictive model, four of the five “Power 5” conferences were being underpaid. Institutions in 
the ACC were underpaid the most, cumulatively receiving $2.5 million less than they should 
have. Following the ACC is the Pac-12, who was underpaid by $2.18 million, the SEC who was 
underpaid $1.26 million and the Big-12 who was underpaid $34,990. The only conference, when 
their institutions totals were added together, resulted in being overpaid was the Big Ten. They 
were overpaid $4.12 million, with $7.29 million in overpayment attributed to two institutions, 
Nebraska and Ohio State.  
 Only one “Group of 5” institution was projected to have a higher payment according to 
the predictive model, and that is the University of Memphis. However, they are only higher than 
one “Power 5” school, Washington State, and it was by less than $400,000. There are only three 
“Group of 5” schools who were predicted to receive more than $3 million, and two of the schools 
are from the American Athletic Conference (Memphis and UConn), with the third school coming 
from the Mountain West (San Diego State). Unlike their “Power 5” counterparts, “Group of 5” 
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institutions are overpaid more than they are underpaid, with three of the five conferences being 
overpaid. Both the Mountain West and American Athletic Conference, who have universities 
vying for membership into “Power 5” conferences, could be the factor for the overpayment of 
guaranteed rights fees.  
 The results also show that while IMG is the largest in the multi-media industry, they are 
unable to utilize this position for their favor. Application of the predictive model reveals that 
IMG should be paying around $117 million for 29 contracts. Rather, IMG overpaid by $13.9 
million, paying $131 million. This is further illustrated in Table XIII showing that IMG has 
seven of the top ten overpaid multimedia rights contracts. An example of this is the University of 
Connecticut, who should be receiving $3 million for the 2015-2016 season, but receives $8.14 
million. Connecticut is not alone, IMG pays millions more than predicted to Nebraska, Texas, 
Georgia, and many others.  
Learfield, IMG’s chief competitor, who was challenging IMG for market dominance prior to 
merging, consistently pays less than what the predictive model would suggest. As indicated by 
the predictive model, the 22 universities Learfield partners with should cost them $95.5 million 
in annual guaranteed rights payments. However, Learfield only paid $82.3 million, saving more 
than $13.2 million. Table XIV illustrates the extent to which they have been able to secure well 
known universities at a fraction of the cost.  
JMI, who is brand new in the intercollegiate multimedia rights arena, only has one contract, 
which they are over paying for by $1 million in the first year of the contract. This number will 
rise as payments to Kentucky increase, and with the addition of Clemson, whose contract starts 
in 2016-2017 season.  
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Table XIII 
 
Top 10 Overpaid  
School Amount Overpaid Rights Holder 
Connecticut  $5,135,889 IMG 
Nebraska  $5,117,508 IMG 
Texas $4,352,094 IMG 
Georgia  $4,029,843 IMG 
New Mexico  $2,718,007 Learfield 
Ohio State  $2,065,086 IMG 
Boise State  $1,467,207 Learfield 
Kentucky $1,331,045 JMI 
UNLV $1,083,601 IMG 
Rutgers  $839,258 IMG 
 
Table XIV 
 
Top 10 Underpaid  
School Amount Overpaid Rights Holder 
Missouri $3,003,224 Learfield  
Oregon State $2,507,835 Learfield  
Indiana $2,364,441 Learfield  
Texas A&M $2,356,811 Learfield  
Purdue $2,280,416 Learfield 
Texas Tech $1,824,725 Learfield  
Iowa State $1,744,696 Learfield 
Memphis  $1,438,962 Learfield  
San Diego State $1,470,497 Learfield  
Tennessee $1,470,117 IMG 
 
The predictive model confirmed previous research, in that, both the performance and 
demand variables utilized were able to accurately predict a university’s guaranteed rights fee 
from their multimedia contract. It also reaffirms the research done by Jensen and Cobb (2004), 
Jensen et al. (2015), and Wishart et al. (2012), who showed in their studies, that on-field 
performance and spectator attendance are both predictors of broadcast rights agreements const. 
Similarly, to Jensen et al. (2015), the operationalized market-variables were expected to be 
significant predictors of sponsorship costs, however, further research determined they failed to 
show a statistically significant amount of variance. By once again illustrating a lack of 
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significance for market-based variables, it can be said with greater confidence, multimedia rights 
companies can enter into agreements with universities in large media markets at a cost far lower 
than what the market dictates (Jensen et al, 2015). The predictive model that was applied is 
especially useful to collegiate administrators and multimedia rights holders alike. Both parties 
will be able to have a better understanding of value, as it pertains to a universities athletic 
department, allowing them to engage in more empirically driven negotiations.  
While the findings illuminate a growing disparity between the “Power 5” and the “Group 
of 5”, perhaps more importantly, they illustrate the growing value for multimedia rights 
contracts, despite the fact that these third-party companies cannot sell the institution’s “Tier I”, 
“Tier II” or “Tier III” rights. IMG and Learfield have dominated the marketplace, but several 
new companies have come on the scene as of late and made a dent in their business. Starting 
with the signing the University of Kentucky for the 2015-2016 season, JMI, Fox Sports, and 
OUTFRONT Media have signed six “Power 5” institutions Kentucky, Clemson, LSU, Virginia, 
Auburn and Michigan State, to extremely lucrative, long-term contracts. The University of 
Kentucky, which left IMG for JMI, signed a 15-year, $210 million contract, with a guaranteed 
rights payment in 2029-2030 set at $16 million. The Fox Sports deal with Michigan State, which 
starts in 2016-2017, is very similar, worth over $150 million during the 15-year period, with their 
guaranteed payment ballooning up to $17.82 million in 2030-2031. Looking ahead to 2016-2017, 
these three newcomers will each have one school in the Top 10 for financial guarantees, with the 
remaining seven belonging to IMG. This is surprising for two reasons. First, as the data has 
shown, IMG is not afraid to overpay in order to secure high profile universities. The fact they are 
losing institutions to these new companies shows that the market is expanding. Secondly, it 
should worry Learfield, who has been getting away with consistency underpaying their 
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institutions. They will either have to make a market correction or risk losing some of their 
biggest clients.  
LIMITATIONS  
A major limitation of this thesis was all of the relevant data was limited to contracts 
between multimedia rights companies and public universities. Although public universities are 
required by law to turn over such data, many universities chose not to do so, or if they did 
comply with the public records request, redacted all relevant information. The failure to comply, 
paired with private universities not being subject to the same laws, meant that some major 
universities, who would likely have lucrative contracts, were left out of the thesis. Such contracts 
not included that would have impacted the thesis include, Alabama, University of Florida, Duke 
University, and University of Southern California, to name a few. Further research could collect 
additional public university contracts to improve the sample size. Should a university choose to 
redact certain contractual information there are legal steps which could be taken to force them to 
provide the complete information.  
Another limitation this thesis faced was the predictor variables used were based upon 
previous research with an emphasis on sport sponsorship; and although they explained 60% of 
the variance, there are some variables not collected which could supply additional information. 
One such variable missing is the number of times that a university has a team televised, because 
it is likely that these multimedia rights companies value institutions who have greater television 
exposure.  Future research may try to find a way to track television exposure and include that 
metric with the data used in this thesis.  
Finally, this thesis was limited by both time and analysis method. Looking at only the 
2015-2016 season and applying only quantitative date. To improve upon this the use of a multi-
year, longitudinal thesis would increase the accuracy of the findings and allowing the results 
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could be extrapolated out further, providing more concrete results that university officials could 
use in their negotiations. The usage of qualitative analysis, to support the quantitative data, 
would help to build upon the results of this thesis. Each one of the contracts is written 
differently, and contain specific rights, so performing an analysis on the contracts themselves to 
determine commonalities or differences would help to further explain the data. 
CONCLUSION 
The sale of multimedia rights within the intercollegiate landscape has become a source of 
much-needed revenue for institutions across the country; and as the landscape continues to shift, 
with universities spending more and more money in order to succeed, there is a greater need to 
accurately predict and plan for future financial needs. With television contracts encompassing 
“Tier I”, “Tier II” and “Tier III” rights, these multimedia rights contracts are the last vestige of 
rights institutions control, making it that much more vital they maximize the potential revenue of 
those rights. The first of its kind, this thesis explored multimedia rights contracts and the 
variables which have significant impact on the size of those contracts.  They now know, based 
upon the empirical evidence, that on-field performance (men’s basketball post season wins), as 
well as consumer demand (football stadium capacity), are significant predictive variables for an 
institutions multimedia guaranteed rights fee. Market variables, once thought to be an important 
factor for sponsorship value, should not be considered when predicting an institution’s 
guaranteed rights fee due to the lack of significance and low impact on the total variance. The 
predictive model showed that IMG, while dominating the marketplace, have been forced to 
consistently over pay to maintain this advantage. Also, the data show that Learfield, IMG’s chief 
competition, has been able to frequently underpay. Meanwhile the newcomer, JMI, is 
significantly overpaying in order to try and grab a piece of the market. The new information 
found in this thesis will help empower athletic administrators in future negotiations.  
 37 
APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A 
 
  
 38 
 
  
 
 
 
 39 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 
 
 
 42 
REFERENCES 
Angell, R., Gorton, M., Sauer, J., Bottomley, P., & White, J. (2016). Don't distract me when I'm 
media multitasking: Toward a theory for raising advertising recall and recognition. Journal 
of Advertising, 45(2), 198-210. doi:10.1080/00913367.2015.1130665 
 
Belloni, M. (2016). Ari emanuel and patrick whitesell unleashed: WME-IMG's strategy, IPO 
plans, china and the doubters. Retrieved 
from http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/features/ari-emanuel-patrick-whitesell-unleashed-
879003 
 
Bennett, R., & Fizel, J. (1995). Telecast deregulation and competitive balance: Regarding NCAA 
division I &nbsp; American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc. 
 
Brewer, R. M., & Pedersen, P. M. (2013). A method for the financial valuation of national 
collegiate athletic association football bowl subdivision programs. Journal of Contemporary 
Athletics; Hauppauge, 7(3), 175-195. Retrieved 
from http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/1627082435/abstract/E411C0
7DB89F4AF9PQ/1 
 
Bromerg, N. (2016). Report: ESPN pays big 12 $10M in restructured TV contract after 
conference doesn't expand. Retrieved from http://sports.yahoo.com/news/report-espn-pays-
big-12-10m-in-restructuring-tv-contract-after-conference-doesnt-expand-144449541.html 
 
Burnsed, B. (2014). Growth in division I athletics expenses outpaces revenue increases. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/growth-division-i-
athletics-expenses-outpaces-revenue-increases 
 
Byers, W., & Hammer, C. H. |. (1995). Unsportsmanlike conduct : Exploiting college athletes. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Cornwell, T. B., Pruitt, S. W., & Clark, J. M. (2005). The relationship between major-league 
sports’ official sponsorship announcements and the stock prices of sponsoring firms. Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 33(4), 401-412. doi:10.1177/0092070305277385 
 
Den Hondt, M., Vanaudenaerde, B., & Vranckx, J. J. (2017). Abstract. Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery - Global Open, 5, 8. doi:10.1097/01.GOX.0000512411.04866.52 
 
Dochterman, S. (2016). Big ten's delany confirms six-year TV deal, offers clue on retirement. 
Retrieved from http://www.thegazette.com/subject/sports/big-tens-delany-confirms-six-
year-tv-deal-offers-clue-on-retirement-20160726 
 
Dunnavant, K. (2004). The 50 year seduction & nbsp; (1st ed.). New York, New York: St. 
Martin Press. 
 
Fizel, J., & Bennett, R. (1989). The impact of college football telecasts on college football 
attendance&nbsp; (Volume 70, Number 4 ed.). University of Texas Press: 
 43 
Galily, Y. (2014). When the medium becomes “Well done”: Sport, television, and technology in 
the twenty-first century. Television & New Media, 15(8), 717-724. 
doi:10.1177/1527476414532141 
 
Greenhouse, L. High court ends n.c.a.a. control of tv football. Retrieved 
from http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/28/us/high-court-ends-ncaa-control-of-tv-
football.html 
 
Greenspan, D. (1988). College football's biggest fumble: The economic impact of the supreme 
court's decision in national collegiate athletic association v. board of regents of the 
university of oklahoma domestic antitrust. Antitrust Bulletin 33.1: 
 
Hall, C. (2016). Dallas’ learfield sports has divided allegiance to alabama and clemson in 
monday’s championship | business. Retrieved 
from http://www.dallasnews.com/business/business/2016/01/08/dallas-learfield-sports-has-
divided-allegiance-to-alabama-and-clemson-in-mondays-championship 
 
Hiestand, M. (2012). Long-term: ESPN lands ACC TV rights through 2027. Retrieved 
from http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2012/05/talk-about-long-term-
espn-lands-acc-tv-rights-through-2027/1 
 
Hinnen, J. ESPN reaches 12-year deal to air college football playoffs. Retrieved 
from http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/21083689/espn-
reaches-12year-deal-to-air-college-football-playoffs 
 
Jensen, J. A. (2012). The importance of winning: An analysis of the relationship between an 
athlete's performance and sponsor exposure during televised sports events. International 
Journal of Sports Marketing & Sponsorship, 13(4), 282-294. 
 
Jensen, J. A. (2015). The path to global sport sponsorship success: An event history analysis 
modeling approach Available from Dissertations & Theses Europe Full Text: Business. 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1701979406 
 
Jensen, J. A., & Cobbs, J. (2014a). Analyzing return-on-investment in sponsorship: Modeling 
brand exposure, price and ROI in formula one automotive competition. (). Rochester, NY: 
Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2322589 
 
Jensen, J. A., & Cobbs, J. (2014b). Predicting return on investment in sport sponsorship 
modeling brand exposure, price, and ROI in formula one automotive competition. Journal of 
Advertising Research, 54(4), 447; 447. 
 
Jensen, J. A., Wakefield, L., Cobbs, J., & Turner, B. A. (2015). Forecasting sponsorship costs: 
Marketing intelligence in the athletic apparel industry. (). Rochester, NY: Retrieved 
from https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2571940 
 
 44 
Jensen, J., Turner, B., & McEvoy, C. (2015). Resource valuation of non-profit organizations: 
The case of the intercollegiate athletics industry. International Review on Public and 
Nonprofit Marketing, 12(2), 169-187. doi:10.1007/s12208-015-0132-9 
 
Jonathan A. Jensen, & Brian A. Turner. (2014). What if statisticians ran college football? A re-
conceptualization of the football bowl subdivision. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in 
Sports, 10(1), 37-48. doi:10.1515/jqas-2013-0071 
 
Kaempfer, W. H., & Pacey, P. L. (1986). Televising college football: The complementarity of 
attendance and viewing & nbsp; University of Texas at Austin: 
 
Kish, M. (2013). See what your university gets from nike, adidas or under armour (database). 
Retrieved 
from http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2013/12/database-nike-
adidas-under-armour-ncaa.html 
 
Kish, M. (2017). Marketing madness: Expansive marketing deals renew debate about corporate 
influence on campus. Retrieved 
from https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/news/2017/03/09/marketing-madness-
expansive-marketing-deals-renew.html 
 
Mawson, L. M., & Bowler III, W. T. (1989). Effects of the 1984 supreme court ruling on the 
television revenues of NCAA division I football programs. Journal of Sport 
Management, 3(2), 79-89. 
 
McCarthy, M. (2013). Are sports prices too high to deliver return on investment? Retrieved 
from http://adage.com/article/media/sports-prices-soar-deliver-return-investment/240749/ 
 
Nathan Tomasini, Chris Frye, & David Stotlar. (2004). National collegiate athletic association 
corporate sponsor objectives: Are there differences between divisions I-A, I-AA, and I-
AAA? 
 
Nielsen. (2015). Local television market, 2016. Retrieved 
from http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/public%20factsheets/tv/2016-
local-television-market-universe-estimates.pdf 
 
Ourand, J. (2011). How high can rights fees go? Retrieved 
from http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/06/06/In-Depth/Rights-
Fees.aspx 
 
Ourand, J. (2013). Three reasons why ceiling for rights fees is nowhere in sight. Retrieved 
from http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/02/25/Media/Sports-
Media.aspx 
 
 45 
Ourand, J. (2016a). Does media rights bubble have a leak? Retrieved 
from http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2016/05/02/In-Depth/Media-
rights.aspx 
 
Ourand, J. (2016b). ESPN stays in the game. Retrieved 
from http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2016/06/20/Media/ESPN-Big-
Ten.aspx 
 
Pacey, P. L., & Wickham, E. D. (1985). College football telecasts: Where are they 
going? Economic Inquiry, 23(1), 93-113. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1985.tb01754.x 
 
Popp, N., DeSchriver, T., McEvoy, C., & Diehl, M. A. (2016). A valuation analysis of corporate 
naming rights for collegiate sport venues. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 25(1), 7. Retrieved 
from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1784876627 
 
Price, D. I., & Sen, K. C. (2003). The demand for game day attendance in college football: An 
analysis of the 1997 division 1-A season. Managerial and Decision Economics, 24(1), 35-
46. doi:10.1002/mde.1100 
 
Rainey, J. (2015). WME/IMG’s college sports unit struggles to meet lofty goals. Retrieved 
from http://variety.com/2015/biz/news/wme-img-worldwide-acquisition-1201539393/ 
 
Rovell, D. (2014). Kentucky sells marketing rights to JMI sports. Retrieved 
from http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11122483 
 
Scully, T. (1985). NCAA v. board of regents of the university of oklahoma: E NCAA's television 
plan is sacked by the sherman act. Washington, DC: Cathol. Univ. Press. 
 
Shafer, L. (2013). The tie that binds: An examination of the relationship between fan motivations 
and sponsorship recognition among college sport consumers Available from Dissertations & 
Theses @ University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Retrieved 
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1438852831 
 
Sherman, R. (2016). NCAA will now make $1 billion from TV rights. Retrieved 
from http://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2016/4/12/11415764/ncaa-tournament-tv-
broadcast-rights-money-payout-cbs-turner 
 
Smith, C. (2012). The ACC's third tier rights and why they're killing the conference. Retrieved 
from https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/06/04/the-accs-third-tier-rights-and-
why-theyre-killing-the-conference/#3af481996375 
 
Smith, M., & Ourand, J. (2011). Expanding ACC will reopen ESPN deal. Retrieved 
from http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/09/26/Colleges/ACC.aspx 
 
Tainsky, S. (2010). Television broadcast demand for national football league contests. Journal of 
Sports Economics, 11(6), 629-640. doi:10.1177/1527002509355636 
 46 
 
Upton, J., & Berkowitz, S. (2012). Budget disparity growing among NCAA division I schools. 
Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-15/budget-disparity-
increase-college-athletics/54960698/1 
 
Voort, E. (2014). First televised football game featured Fordham, waynesburg in 1939. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2014-09-28/first-televised-football-game-
featured-fordham-waynesburg-1939 
 
